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(e purpose of this systematic review is to highlight the salient elements of learning from incidents in the aircraft maintenance and
continuing airworthiness management area. (is involved the review of more than 1,000 publications reflecting practice in
different domains. (e cache was eventually distilled to 18 publications of relevance to learning from incidents. (e systematic
review of the literature was not intended to be exhaustive, but it was deliberately bound by the parameters of predefined search
terms. A robust analysis was performed on the 18 distilled publications with the use of the NVivo software. A critical and
systematic examination of this body of literature further supported the development of the five codification themes.(e analysis of
the literature revealed the benefits of a just culture as an enabler of reporting and learning from incidents. Moreover, it identified
limitations inherent in the current body of knowledge. (e most evident being a paucity of literature relevant to the featured
industry segment. Some impediments to learning from incidents are also highlighted. Central to this is the prevalence of lack of
effective focus and practice on satisfactory causation of events. Currently, the efforts applied across many featured domains appear
to be based upon ineffective legacy linear practices. However, emerging investigative philosophies that look beyond direct cause
and effect contain opportunities for practitioners to consider causation through dawning axioms. (is systematic review could be
used in the European aviation regulatory activities associated with improving learning from incident in aircraft maintenance and
continuing airworthiness management.
1. Introduction
Freeman Dyson, the notable theoretical physicist and
mathematician, once said, “aviation is a branch of engi-
neering that is least forgiving of mistakes” [1]. It is true that
such high reliability domains can pose a great degree of risk
that may in turn contribute to mistakes being made.
However, a guiding principle of continuously improving
aviation safety is our ability to learn from events such as
incidents. In the world of aviation safety, standards and
recommended practices tend to be biased towards trans-
lating the experiences from such events into tangible out-
comes aimed at preventing similar reoccurrences.
A review of safety in aviation from the perspective of
maintenance and continuing airworthiness management
staff is the key to understanding the relationship between
safety and the concept of learning from incidents [2]. De-
spite the efforts of fallible humans and the ever-increasing
complex systems they moderate, achieving a utopian reality
where there are no risks or hazards present is clearly an
unreasonable expectation [3]. Safety in aviation has evolved
along a continuum from the early 1900s where aircraft
mechanical and design issues were the primary contributors
to aircraft accidents, according to the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) [4]. Improvements in these
technical factors reached a plateau in the 1970s and the
challenges realised then were centred around human per-
formance and limitations [5]. Notwithstanding efforts and
investment in human factor initiatives, accidents and inci-
dents continued to occur. In the 1990s, there was a clear
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recognition that, as the aviation industry continued to de-
velop, there were a number of factors outside the human at
play with a potential to affect safety behaviour [6]. (is
paradigm-shift informed today’s systematic approach to
safety and, in particular, the approach to learning from
incidents [7].
Most people relate safety to freedom from risk and
danger [8]. Unfortunately, risk and danger are often ubiq-
uitous in the presence of high reliability activities. Managing
sources of risk and danger are a tall order for some orga-
nisations. (e ICAO Doc 9859 [4] recognises that “aviation
systems cannot be completely free of hazards and associated
risks.” However, the guidance does acknowledge that, as
long as the appropriate measures are in place to control these
risks, a satisfactory balance between “production and pro-
tection” can be achieved. Perrow [3] acknowledges that “we
load our complex systems with safety devices in the form of
buffers, redundancies, circuit breakers, alarms, bells, and
whistles” because no system is perfect.
When one thinks of the word “incident,” it conjures up
the notion of an action that may have grave consequences.
Similarly, the word “accident” is often used in the context of
an unplanned event or a particular circumstance. In many
industrial sectors and business domains, these descriptors
are used with a degree of interchangeability when the words
are applied to describe events. In the world of aviation, there
are clear high-level definitions for both event categories, and
these are based on potential for harm. (roughout aviation,
learning from incidents is often considered to be one means
of augmenting what Perrow [3] terms “safety devices.”
“Experience is the best teacher” according to Kleiner and
Roth [9] as they claim that the causes of the mistakes are
often not featured and continue to be present in the absence
of learning. In general terms, Nonaka [10] suggests that
creating new knowledge extends past a mechanistic ap-
proach and is strongly related to employees’ insights. An
effective enabler of learning in this area is the collation of
information on incidents. Details of the related processes,
environment, procedures, competencies, and implementing
timely corrective actions all have a positive impact on
learning and help prevent recurrence in the future. Learning
from incidents is therefore mainly associated with post-
incident learning.
Detecting and identifying hazards highlighted through
incident reporting systems is recommended by International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards and rec-
ommended practices as an effective means of achieving
practicable levels of safe operations.(erefore, objective data
mined from a reporting system offers the potential to en-
lighten aviation stakeholders and to illuminate weakness
that may be present. Such information can assist with a
better understanding of events and augment mitigating
measures against the potential effects of these hazards.When
incidents occur, this can be an indication of a failure in an
organisation’s process and/or practice. Due to continuous
challenges faced by the organisations in the aviation industry
there is potential to learn from resulting incidents and
precursors. (e learning is based on the potential new
knowledge available from the associated collection, analysis,
and interventions of these events. Effective learning can be
considered as a successful translation of safety information
into knowledge that actively improves the operating envi-
ronment and helps prevent recurrence of events we can
potentially learn from. Learning in this context can often be
experienced as modifying or implementing new knowledge
where cultural, technical, or procedural elements are inte-
grated. (erefore, when learning in this context is trans-
formed into measures to prevent reoccurrence, an
organisation often has a reasonable means of mitigating
future similar events.
(e objective of this systematic review is to examine how
learning from incidents occurs in aircraft maintenance and
continuing airworthiness management and other sectors
and what issues impact learning in those areas. It also in-
tends to identify the contributing and constraining factors to
learning from incidents. A qualitative review approach was
selected as it has the advantage of providing a deeper
contextual understanding of the literature and can assist
with better research integration. Applying a degree of rigour
and comprehensiveness can assist with advancing knowl-
edge and identifying research gaps and aspects for further
research in this particular area.
(e publication’s systematic literature review covered
primary publications up until 2017. As the subject of
learning from incidents is a valid topic with potential to
augment safety, a brief review of a cross-section of the latest
publications was performed to see if a “delta” in the
knowledge exists. Insley and Turkoglu [11] reaffirm aircraft
maintenance is still a key point of concern within many areas
of aviation. (eir work highlights frequently recorded
maintenance related consequences, naming runway excur-
sions and air turn-backs in the highest percentile. (e study
identified factors relating directly to these events naming
inadequate and incorrect procedures, poorly executed in-
spection tasks, and incorrect installation as common causal
factors ascribed to the event categories named. (ese issues
are not unique to Europe. Habib and Turkoglu [12] review a
dataset of maintenance-related incidents originating outside
of Europe (Nigeria). (eir analysis revealed causal factors
such as poor aircraft husbandry, deficiencies in inspection
and testing, and inadequate safety oversight (organisation
and regulator). Habib and Turkoglu [12] also consider the
consequential impact of errors as causal elements in sub-
sequent events. (ey also highlight the increase in incidents
recorded and attribute this to a recent increase in air
movements. Batuwangala et al. [13] present the idea that
forecasted growth in air traffic requires a strong effort to
ensure aviation incidents continue to be progressively re-
duced. (ey recognise a novel approach to safety im-
provements will need to be propagated in support of this.
Although the authors point out some of the benefits of
implementing a safety management system (SMS), they
reaffirm the notion that not all areas of aviation operations
are mandated to comply with SMS requirements. Some of
the implementing constraints recorded by Batuwangala et al.
[13] include protection of safety data/reporters, lack of just
culture and reporting, and reporting system deficiencies, to
name a few.
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(e review of the sample examining a cross-section of
current research in the area of aircraft maintenance and
continuing airworthiness does not identify any significant
new knowledge in support of this publication.(e additional
exercise reaffirms the concept that some organisations are
continuing to ineffectively embrace a desire to learn from
incidents.
2. Materials and Methods
In order to conduct an efficient and effective review, a
structured approach was deemed necessary. Okoli and
Schabram [14] state that “a dedicated methodological ap-
proach is necessary in any kind of literature review.” An
initial search of literature highlighted a scarcity of best-
practice guidelines for conducting systematic literature re-
views in the subject domain. (is situation is also experi-
enced in other sectors as Levy and Ellis [15] andWebster and
Watson [16] confirm. Qualitative research involves handling
considerable volumes of data and a degree of discipline is
required so that search results and decisions regarding
subject inclusions and exclusions are recorded and refer-
ences are well managed. Endnote was used in support of the
literature review during this research. An electronic database
is useful for supporting a search strategy, arranging publi-
cations, and storing references [17]. (e qualitative data
analysis software NVivo [18] was used to augment the data
management, storage, and analysis associated with the lit-
erature review. NVivo possesses many functions that are
capable of facilitating the synthesis of a review [19]. How-
ever, the software does not have the capability of under-
standing text and the analytical skills of a researcher cannot
be replaced in this respect.
2.1. Searchwith PredefinedTerms. Bandara et al. [19] suggest
two main criteria to consider before a search to identify
papers for extraction and review begins: the source and
search strategy. (e source considers which outlets and
databases to target, and the search strategy refers to the
search terms and discipline to be exercised during the
manuscript extraction process. A systematic search of the
literature was performed in the following databases:
(i) Web of Science [20]
(ii) Scopus [21]
(iii) IEEE Xplore [22]
(iv) ProQuest [23]
(v) EBSCO [24]
(e following set of predefined terms associated with the
thematic of the systematic review was selected to search in
these sources:
(i) “learning from incidents”
(ii) “learning from experience”
(iii) “aircraft maintenance”
(iv) “aircraft management”
(v) “safety management systems”
(is step concluded with the creation of an initial set of
publications, which would further be filtered in next steps.
2.2. Practical Screen of Title and Abstract. In this step, each
title and each abstract were reviewed (practical screen). (is
part of the process not only had to be broad enough to create
a sufficient number of applicable publications but also had to
be practically manageable. (e following criteria were laid
down for the practical screen of the source bibliographic
details, title, and abstract:
(i) Subject: related to learning from incidents and past
experiences
(ii) Setting: any high reliability industry or sector where
learning from incidents is critical.
(iii) Publication: journal or peer reviewed conference
proceedings
(iv) Date range: published post 1992
(e output of the practical screen step produces a list of
publications denoted as the screened set of publications. An
Endnote library was created to store and manage the full text
of the retrieved publications.
2.3. Classification to Primary and Secondary Publications.
(is step involved the filtering (classification) of publications
in the following two categories:
(i) Primary publications: any research publication
based on original data collected by the publications’
author(s)
(ii) Secondary publications: those publications based on
data generated by somebody other than the au-
thor(s), e.g., a review and use of existing literature/
data developed by another party
Effectively, the screened set of publications was split over
to a subset of primary publications and subset of secondary
publications. Of those, in the next step, only the subset of
primary publications was used.
2.4. Application of Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria.
Brunton et al. [25] suggest there needs to be explicit in-
clusion and exclusion criteria in order for the reviewer to
screen titles and abstracts for topical, population, temporal,
and methodological relevance. Having a set of criteria helps
to reduce any researcher bias in the screening system. A set
of inclusion and exclusion criteria was developed consid-
ering the below objectives and in accordance with the
guidelines included in [26, 27]:
(i) To review current literature and to identify factors
related to learning from incidents
(ii) To identify obstacles and to learn from incidents
(iii) To make recommendations how learning from in-
cidents might be improved in the aircraft mainte-
nance and continuing airworthiness management
sector
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In this context, the inclusion and exclusion criteria
presented in Table 1 were used for the filtering of the subset
of primary publications. (e output of this step leads to the
creation of the final set of publications.
2.5. NVivo Analysis and Codification with /emes. In this
step, the Endnote library containing the final set of publi-
cations is imported to NVivo for further analysis. (e fol-
lowing approaches, previously suggested by Bandara et al.
[19], were used for the selection of the codification themes:
(i) Deductive: themes reported on are predetermined to
some extent. In this case, these predetermined
themes were the output of a focus group process.(e
present review paper does not report details on the
focus group, as this is within the scope of a future
research paper of the authors.
(ii) Inductive: themes reported are derived from analysis
of the literature.
In addition to the three inductive themes (learning from
incidents, just culture, and precursors) arising during the
literature review, two additional themes (root cause and
reporting) were deduced from conducting focus group ac-
tivities concurrently with the review. (e aggregate of both
of these efforts resulted in five themes being developed.
According to Kitzinger [29], “focus groups are group dis-
cussions organised to explore a specific set of issues such as
people’s views and experiences.” (e idea of conducting
group interviews is not a new one. Bogardus [30] is an early
example of a reference to utilizing the group interview. Frey
and Fontana [31] say that group interviews can be formally
structured for a specific purpose or can be performed in a
more informal setting where a researcher can “stimulate a
group discussion.” A total framework of five nodes even-
tually representing the themes was constructed in the NVivo
database and used in support of completing the systematic
literature review. (ese five nodes were also later used as the
main framework for the semistructured interview template.
(e description and origin (focus group or literature
analysis) of the themes identified are described in Table 2.
Using the codification themes, the final set of publication
was searched using the NVivo software to extract and code
the passages identified to any of the coding categories.
NVivo only provides thematic classifications of data based
on the occurrence of key words. (is merely assisted in
identifying common prescribed keywords in publications,
enabling classification into categories or clusters of words
and examination of relationships within these publications.
As NVivo does not perform analysis, the researcher must
search the outputs and extract meaning for themselves.
(us, each of the publications were physically reviewed
inductively by the researchers. Effectively, the final set of
publications was searched and coded to Table 2 which has
five themes. (e coding process consisted of selecting rel-
evant passages of text that were captured in one or several of
the framework nodes. (e overall document screening
process and associated steps described in the previous
sections are illustrated in the flowchart of Figure 1.
Maykut and Morehouse [32] define a propositional
statement as “a statement of fact the researcher tentatively
proposes, based on the data.” Memos were used to draft
these summary statements which form part of Section 3 of
this paper.
3. Results and Discussion
In the first step of the process described in Section 2 of this
paper, the search with predefined returned in excess of 1,000
publications (initial set of publications). From this tranche, a
total of 239 publications were retrieved in the practical
screen phase (constituting the screen set of publications),
which were then classified to a subset of 53 primary pub-
lications and a subset of 186 secondary publications. (e
final set of publications was derived by applying the in-
clusion and exclusion criteria of Table 1, leading to a total of
18 publications. (e progressive filtering process is pre-
sented in the flowchart of Figure 2.
(e 18 publications are summarised in Table 3, where the
utilised methodology (qualitative and quantitative of mixed)
and the application domain (different industries) are also
provided.
In the next step, this final set of 18 publications was
analysed and codified with NVivo, using the five codification
themes described in Table 2. (is has led to the distribution
of publications per codification theme shown in the flow-
chart of Figure 3.
One can observe from this distribution that publications
share some common codification themes. (is is presented
in Table 4, which provides the results of the mapping ex-
ercise of the 18 publication against each of the five codifi-
cation themes.
Memos were used to draft the literature summary
statements, which formed the final narrative for the syn-
thesis. NVivo facilitated collation of the summary state-
ments and enabled a transparent audit trail in support of the
literature review exercise presented separately in sections
under the five codification themes.
3.1. Root Cause. An overview of the Jacobsson et al.’s [43]
study findings that relate to poor causation identification can
be consolidated as follows: fewer event aspects recorded,
often only operator error and technical failure recorded, and
shallow root causation. It was found that when limited
analysis of underlying event causes is performed, only
limited effective actions are possible. (is is evident when
poor root cause analysis only contributes to minor proce-
dural, and cosmetic changes are aimed at preventing re-
currence. Such deficiencies were considered to have a limited
impact upon the potential lessons available as a result of
ineffective root cause establishment.
Pickthall [44] considers root cause through the lens of an
individual’s competence when a technical and human fac-
tors-related impediment is present. (e research examined
the prevalence of these factors when aircraft maintenance
staffs perform fault diagnosis on complex aircraft systems.
(e researcher found that often maintenance staffs are
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unable to diagnose faults in an accurate and timely manner.
(e results of the study indicated that events are often caused
by poorly resourced supports, such as system diagnostics
and test equipment. On a practical level, these contributing
factors are believed to have a negative influence on the
inability to establish adequate root causes and prevent the
recurrence of faults.
(e Hobbs andWilliamson [42] research study explored
patterns of potentially unsafe acts often perpetuated by
aircraft maintenance staff. Violations (routine and excep-
tional) and mistakes were found to be closely related to
deteriorating maintenance standards. A potential relation-
ship reinforces a link between violations and less than op-
timal safety standards. According to the researchers, root
Table 1: Inclusion and exclusion criteria used for the filtering of the subset of primary publications (table adopted fromClare and Kourousis
[28]).
Included Excluded
Research studies Literature reviews
Qualitative and mixed methods Quantitative methods
Perceptions and experiences Focused on decision-making and legislative requirements
Reference to just culture Not about “no blame” or a punitive approach





Table 2: Codification themes used in the NVivo analysis of the final set of publications.
Codification theme Description Origin
Root cause Reason to establish causation Focus group
Reporting Value of reporting to learning from incidents Focus group
Learning from incidents Outcomes of learning from incidents Literature analysis
Just culture Impact of just culture on learning from incidents Literature analysis
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Figure 1: Flowchart of the overall document screening process and associated steps utilised in the systematic review.
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cause of such violations can often be traced back to the
prevailing culture within the organisation itself.
3.2. Reporting. In their work, Gray and Williams [40] ex-
amined whether culture surrounding learning from inci-
dents can be compounded by “strategic defence routines,”
resulting in recurrence of the event or similar ones. (eir
study was conducted through questionnaire in health ser-
vices’ domains. (ey found that real learning from incidents
can take place as a result of a transformation effort facilitated
by a holistic approach. (e authors refer to “reframed
learning approach;” however, the publication contains little
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Figure 2: Output of the progressing filtering process applied during the systematic review, leading to the 18 publications (final set of
publications).
Table 3: A summary of attributes of the papers arising from the systematic literature search.
Paper Methodology Domain
Atak and Kingma [33] Qualitative Aircraft maintenance
Drupsteen and Hasle [34] Qualitative Chemical, construction, and manufacturing
Drupsteen and Wybo [35] Qualitative Healthcare
Drupsteen et al. [36] Qualitative Chemical, construction, energy, government, metal, and transportation
Furniss et al. [37] Qualitative Technology, transport, energy production, and healthcare
Gartmeier et al. [38] Qualitative Healthcare
Gerede [39] Qualitative Aircraft maintenance/regulatory
Gray and Williams [40] Qualitative Healthcare
Bjerg Hall-Andersen and Broberg [41] Qualitative Engineering consultancy
Hobbs and Williamson [42] Mixed Aircraft maintenance
Jacobsson et al. [43] Mixed Petrochemical, food and drug, and energy
Lukic et al. [2] Qualitative Energy
Pickthall [44] Mixed Aircraft maintenance
Silva et al. [45] Mixed Manufacturing, construction, production, and distribution of energy
Steiner [46] Qualitative Production and distribution
Storseth and Tinmannsvik [47] Qualitative Railway and maritime
Ward et al. [48] Qualitative Aircraft maintenance
Zwetsloot et al. [49] Mixed Manufacturing, construction, and others
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practical exemplars which would expand more on the details
and the applicability of a similar approach to learning from
incidents.
Gartmeier et al. [38] examined if reporting can be used as
a strategy for workplace learning in a health service setting.
(ey have considered error reporting attitudes and behav-
iours in a two-stage study performed via a longitudinal
survey. (e results suggest that organisations should high-
light benefits of error reporting, ease of use and accessibility
of reporting systems are important, and barriers can be
modified to encourage reporting.
Bjerg Hall-Andersen and Broberg [41] conducted a
“natural experiment” in an engineering consultancy firm.
Following implementation of an information transfer da-
tabase, discreet learning processes found to be inter-
connected within some domain elements. However, there is
no evidence of collective interdomain learning across
functions. (e lessons learned are not through potential
negative consequences and respective actions arising from a
reporting system input but brokered through a moderated
database. A single “embedded” case study may not support
the generalizability of the results in other domains. However,
for those who wish to develop a better understanding of
learning processes across knowledge boundaries, the “im-
plications for practitioners” contained in the study are
considered applicable.
Steiner [46] conducted a qualitative study set in a
workshop environment with data collected through semi-
structured interviews, participant observations, document
analysis, and note taking. (e theoretical shortcomings
defined by the literature that relate to barriers to organ-
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Figure 3: Distribution of the final set of 18 publications in the five codification themes following the NVivo analysis and codification step of
the systematic review process.
Table 4: Mapping of 18 publications (final set of publications) against the five codification themes.
Precursors Just culture Root cause Reporting Learning from incidents
3 4 3 9 10
Atak and Kingma [33] X
Drupsteen and Hasle [34] X X
Drupsteen and Wybo [35] X X
Drupsteen et al. [36] X
Furniss et al. [37] X
Gartmeier et al. [38] X
Gerede [39] X X
Gray and Williams [40] X
Bjerg Hall-Andersen and Broberg [41] X
Hobbs and Williamson [42] X X X
Jacobsson et al. [43] X X
Lukic [2] X
Pickthall [44] X X
Silva et al. [45] X X
Steiner [46] X
Storseth and Tinmannsvik [47] X
Ward et al. [48] X X X
Zwetsloot et al. [49] X
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that a consolidating feature of organisational learning, such
as reporting of issues and data capture, are not adequately
discussed in the study.
Atak and Kingma [33] conducted an ethnographic-based
case study in an aircraft maintenance environment, aug-
mented by field notes, document reviews, and interviews.
Tensions between quality assurance and maintenance
management were identified and the prevailing safety cul-
ture examined in the context of “integration, differentiation,
and fragmentation.” (e study offers a comprehensive
picture of the applied challenges experienced by aviation
safety staff from an “embedded” perspective. However, the
measures to prevent bias and understanding the issues are
not well-defined in the publication.
Pickthall [44] examined the mixed methods approach
using a structured interview devised from an academic
format. (is study examined issues that arose when aircraft
maintenance staff interacted with complex aircraft systems
for defect rectification. Occasionally a “no fault found”
determination has been found to be made. However, the
fault-finding inputs in that case were ineffective, and the
fault returned soon afterwards. (e research considered the
management-influenced behaviours such as time pressures,
poor communication, failure to adopt and share best
practice, inadequate training, and reluctance to change. (e
work uncovered that indispensable resources, such as air-
craft test equipment, integrated onboard diagnostic systems,
andmaintenancemanuals, often fail to support maintenance
staff when undertaking diagnosis tasks. (e results suggest
that these elements can actively constrain maintenance staff
when they attempt to consistently manage effective and
timely defect rectification. Moreover, the results are well
presented and worthy of consideration when developing
training material in support of learning from incidents.
Storseth and Tinmannsvik [47] performed a qualitative
study, using semistructured interviews in marine and rail
industries domains, to examine how individuals retro-
spectively look back and consider learning from events.
Learning indicators for the study were developed by the
authors in an earlier related study. (e research methods
were augmented by theoretical studies and document
analysis. (ey have found that learning within organisations
takes place within the parameters of “actor-context con-
stellations” where there are no defined start and finish
points. (is assumption is not sufficiently balanced against
the need to formally consider the exigency for structure
when developing learning from incident outcomes.
In their research study, Zwetsloot et al. [49] endorse the
importance of learning when implementing a “zero-accident
vision” in nonaviation-related domains. (e work also
highlights safety commitment, communication, and safety
culture as learning enablers. Research design was a mixed
method approach using a quantitative survey supported by
interviews and workshops. (e qualitative component of the
research verified that learning was evident throughout the
featured organisations. “Learning by doing” was considered
a more effective approach in support of learning from in-
cidents where employees are motivated to fully engage in the
process, and supervisors can moderate theme-based safety
dialogue. An extensive survey was performed across 27
organisations. (e qualitative methods (interviews and
workshops) were applied although they were not formally
analysed, and their synopses were used to validate the survey
results. (e survey component of the research records high
scores relating to learning action; however, there were
differences noted between staff’s perception (and manage-
ment) of learning action in approximately 25% of cases.
Moreover, there was less diversity recorded across the
learning condition dimension. (e researchers considered
this analogous to organisational commitment to safety.
Safety commitment, communication, culture, and learning
were examined as individual aspects of implementing a zero-
accident environment. However, their cumulative rela-
tionship was not fully examined and the impact is not
discussed sufficiently.
Hobbs and Williamson [42] conducted a mixed method
study examining the application of a previously developed
“three-way distinction” of unsafe acts questionnaire in an
aircraft maintenance context. An initial questionnaire was
developed through the application of a disciplined confi-
dential critical interview technique with 72 aircraft main-
tenance mechanics. (e results yielded 48 elements
(validated by air accident experts) and transposed into a
maintenance behaviour questionnaire distributed to 4,600
licensed and 300 unlicensed aircraft maintenance mechanics
(1359 questionnaires were returned). (e principle com-
ponent analysis was the method used to reduce the number
of variables in the dataset for analysis by extracting those
considered important to the study. (e authors’ choice of
analysis does not appear to consider the competence in the
context of skill-based errors and complex situations such as
automation. However, the focus the publication brings on
the need for aircraft maintenance staff to be aware of the
cumulative effect of “seemingly insignificant” incidents
fortifies the need to be proactive when it comes to learning
from incidents.
3.3. Learning from Incidents. (e objective of Lukic et al. [2]
study was to highlight factors considered to be important for
effective learning, e.g., participants, process, incident, and
knowledge. Staff involvement and trust were positive at-
tributes capable of supporting learning. Attributing blame
and poorly developed root causation were found to detract
from learning. (e research also examined impact of formal
and informal learning initiatives. Informal learning was
found to be more difficult to record and codify, and potential
for learning could be limited in some cases. In their paper,
Lukic et al. [2] highlighted that the “over-simplification” of
incidents and contend id, often the reason of incidents, are
misunderstood when attempting to translate incident and
accident data into knowledge and learning. It is noted there
is an absence of information on the structure applied to the
quantitative analysis and how rigour was applied to the
process. However, the authors do clarify the analysis was
both data and participant driven.
(e Gerede [39] study considered some of the challenges
associated with the successful implementation of safety
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management systems (SMS) in aircraft maintenance orga-
nisations. (e SMS structure is comprised of “safety policy
and objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance,
and safety promotion.” Safety risk management and safety
assurance were found to be important elements under-
scoring the effectiveness of day to day activities. Failure to
create a just culture and fear of punishment for reporting
shares a common cultural association. (e situation is at-
tributed to a potential combination of lack of trust and
negative perceptions associated with organisational culture.
Moreover, Gerede [39] identified that the absence of
communication and trust may present implementation
challenges within the maintenance organisations. If a just
culture does not exist at national aviation authority state
level, then it is questionable if the implementation of an SMS
would be effective. It is unclear if the four structural elements
of safety management were fully considered during the
training or the data gathering phase of the study. (is may
account for the absence of any direct reference to learning
from incidents in the study’s findings.
Drupsteen et al. [36] conducted case studies with se-
lected individuals in various domains, including trans-
portation. (eir survey considered the following elements:
steps in the process where learning is lost, formal organi-
sation of steps, efficiency of steps on a daily basis, difference
between espoused and actual performance of steps, and
differences amongst featured areas. In their work, they also
state that “many incidents occur because organisations fail to
learn from past lessons” because the traditional approach
often stops short of preventing future incidents.(e research
paper presented a model that examines the investigating and
analysing incidents, planning and prevention, and inter-
vening and evaluating steps in a learning process. (e
evaluation stage was found to be a primary learning bot-
tleneck and reporting of incidents being next. Results in-
dicated daily practice of learning was good, but follow-up
steps in the process are often neglected in comparison to
incident analysis. (ere was a significant difference between
how well the investigation and incident analysis stage and
the evaluation stage were performed and organised.
In their work, Ward et al. [48] offer a concise overview
of key aspects of aircraft maintenance practice and
present an accurate snapshot of the development and
architecture of pertinent regulation. Understanding the
aircraft maintenance system complexities is an essential
precursor to implementing improvements. Organisa-
tional processes cannot be explained in terms of a linear
approach due to the nonlinear characteristics of flexibility
and variability of comprising elements. It was found that
the resulting relationship between the individuals and the
systems have a direct impact upon the system and pre-
vailing environment. (eir model comprised of the fol-
lowing elements: system level, process activity,
dependencies, and stakeholders. Four reporting veins
were uncovered focusing on unique aspects of product
airworthiness and system performance, i.e., data inac-
curacy, quality assurance, personal injury, and occur-
rence reporting and suggested changes were highlighted.
(e researchers found that regardless of how an issue
presented, the staff continue to experience performance
constraints if communication remains poor.
Jacobsson et al. [43] acknowledge the degree of interest
invested in learning from incidents but question the effi-
ciency of learning from incidents in some organisations.
(ey found that event investigations often stop short and
only partially deal with some of the elements affecting the
event. Although unwelcome events are less prevalent, less
severe events provide learning opportunities. Analysis of the
learning cycle is valuable and such an approach can offer an
insight into inherent precursors to accident conditions.(ey
present a model featuring: reporting, analysis, decisions,
implementation, and follow-up in an incident learning cycle
format. Assessing effectiveness of an incident learning cycle
was designed from analysing each individual step against the
following dimensions: scope, quality, time, and information
of the first cycle loop. A general assessment of the second
learning loop was performed using participant interviews.
Subject matter experts applied their judgement in support of
developing weighting factors for each of the model elements.
(e paper refers to the analysis of incident learning systems
but the purpose of conducting the safety audit is not
specified. (e relationship (if any) between the outcome of
the safety audits and the efficiency of the learning systems
does not appear to be fully articulated.
Silva et al. [45] examine how organisations use accident
information to reduce the occurrence of unwelcome events.
(ey suggest it is necessary to achieve a balance between
adequately resourcing safety initiatives and maintaining
acceptable levels of safety. (ey suggest that factors such as
organisational culture, just culture, and event data, if
managed, can contribute to a reduction in events. Learning
within organisations should address effective information
processing and interpretation. Combining technical and
social strategies resulted in uncovering four patterns of
practice that corresponded to different levels of learning.
In their work, Drupsteen and Wybo [35] conclude that
organisations use experience gained from past events in
order to improve safety. (ey introduce the term “pro-
pensity to learn” which refers to an organisation’s predis-
position to learning and suggest an organisation can apply
lessons from past events such as warning signals, mistakes,
incidents, and accidents. (ey found that hindsight can
determine if an organisation did learn from an event, but
there are no models to assist with gauging the “propensity”
of an organisation to learn. (e object of the study was to
expound two sets of indicators that would contribute to
gauging an organisation’s inclination to learn. Using a
previously validated questionnaire, the participants’ per-
ception was assessed on learning indicators. (ey deduced
from the review of literature that organisations displaying
high learning propensity were also successful with learning
from experience and sharing lessons amongst staff. Indi-
cators based on three categories (attitudes and organisa-
tional conditions and systems) utilizing six indicators were
developed to gauge organisational learning. A second set of
indicators was developed in support of assessing individual
propensity to learn from experience, specifically measuring
attitude towards each of the stages of a generic learning
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process, i.e., detection, analysis, follow-up, evaluation, and
sharing information. However, as the study was based solely
on the perception of staff, it is unclear if the presented
indicators alone would be satisfactory to elicit enough po-
tentially subjective data to reinforce the results.
Furniss et al. [37] examined Hollnagel et al.’s [50]
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) which
explores how functional variability resonates within systems,
i.e., how well elements work together in a system. (ey also
discuss how FRAM can be modified to support complex
socio technical system improvements. (is is presented in
the context of four principles that encase the main as-
sumptions (equivalence of success and failure, approximate
adjustments, emergence, and functional resonance) from a
FRAM practitioner perspective. (eir study considered how
human factor methods “are functionally coupled to a
broader system of human factors practice” [37]. (e four
steps of the FRAM analysis were augmented by two addi-
tional steps: the purpose of FRAM analysis and respondent
validation.
Drupsteen and Hasle [34] examined if organisations can
learn more effectively from past incidents, and future in-
cidents could be prevented.(ey suggest that learning can be
improved if limiting factors are addressed. (e learning
process in different companies was analysed and discussed.
(e researchers used a topic list to assess if human, technical,
or organisational aspects were being addressed and in which
elements were related to specific learning phases.(ey found
that some of the main causes of the constraints to learning
can be related to lack of knowledge, unwillingness to report,
causation not established, and uncertainty regarding follow-
up action. Some conditions that enable these deficiencies are
centred around misplaced cultural issues, over-focus on
direct causation, and poorly defined safety management
procedures for example. (e benefits of considering all
active and latent failures as direct and indirect causes, re-
spectively, are unclear. (e study concentrated on the la-
tency of causation. (e authors state learning from incident
initiatives should exercise a more generic effort to support
prevention. However, one of the limitations stated was the
lack of homogeneity amongst the participating
organisations.
3.4. Just Culture. Ward et al. [48] endorse the perception
that aircraft maintenance is a “highly regulated, safety
critical, complex, and competitive industry.” (ey also state
that to positively perpetuate the above attributes, it is
necessary to further develop an operational model that can
account for “what is meant to happen and what actually
happens.” A just culture is defined as “where people feel they
can report mistakes made without fear of punishment
(deliberate acts of damage or violations are different).” (e
researchers proffer that a just culture can be considered as an
effective enabler of good quality incident reporting.
Gerede [39] examines some of the challenges associated
with the implementation of the ICAO SMS standards and
recommended practices which support the aviation industry
and regulators to transition from prescriptive oversight
methods to those based on performance metrics. (ese
challenges relate to the successful propagation of a just
culture which is considered as a basic principle of successful
SMS implementation. (e study strongly suggests that a
failure to foster a just culture would be considered to have a
negative impact upon effective data collection (reporting),
organisational learning, and the subsequent ability to learn
from incidents.
Silva et al. [45] put forward the value of information
gleaned from incidents in support of learning and future
event prevention. (ey examine how organisations utilise
information and the strategies that assist with the propa-
gation of lessons. (ey also highlight the need for organi-
sations to encourage a learning culture and suggest the
positive contribution made by reporting. It was found that a
seminal element of organisational learning is a just culture,
where errors and mistakes can be reported, and violations
are managed fairly. In parallel, it is suggested that pro-
portionate organisational responses are required to balance
safety and accountability.
In their work, Drupsteen and Hasle [34] proffer that
learning from past incidents can assist with understanding
potential future events and possibly reduce their conse-
quences. (e study examines the causes associated with
organisations failure to learn from previous events. Trust
and openness were identified as key elements necessary for
organisational learning. In the absence of these values,
under-reporting is often evident. (e researchers point out
that the presence of what they term a “blame culture” also
inhibits learning as potential reporters fear of being treated
unjustly for their actions.
3.5. Precursors. Ward et al. [48] suggest improvements can
be gained when organisational factors with a potential to
contribute to incidents are understood. (ey consider these
elements in the context of the reason [8] taxonomy (im-
mediate, workplace, and organisational) of factors as sys-
temic precursors. An improved understanding of these
elements can also shift the focus of unwarranted blame from
“the individual” within the system. Aviation maintenance
management systems are increasingly adopting an approach
where identifying systemic precursors contribute to a just
outcome.
(emain purpose of the Drupsteen andWybo [35] study
was to develop a set of indicators capable of determining an
organisation’s “propensity to learn.” (e researchers argue
that the most effective set of indicators are those that could
be proactively considered as “leading indicators.” Precursors
that represent activity-based inputs can signal early degra-
dation of safety systems.
One of the main aims of the Hobbs and Williamson [42]
study was to ascertain if unsafe acts could be predicted as a
result of analysing self-reported unsafe acts. (eir analysis of
demographic variables suggested that the occurrence of
routine and exceptional violations was associated with a
participants’ age. Higher levels of associated behaviours were
linked with younger participants. (e researchers were able
to identify potential precursors to aircraft quality issues by
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association with less than optimal performance of aircraft
maintenance staff. (e analysis implied a distinction exists
between what are termed routine and exceptional violations.
(e former tends to be more frequent and can be associated
with shortcuts linked to routine tasks.(e latter group is of a
high-risk nature but occurs less frequently.
3.6. Common Limitations Identified in the Reviewed
Publications. Although there was a distinctive scarcity of
information across the reviewed literature relating to the
domain under primary investigation, enablers, and chal-
lenges to learning in the featured preserves, which were well
noted, learning from incidents across all domains shares a
kindred desired outcome of delivering lessons that help
prevent recurrence of similar incidents in the future.
However, throughout the review, a few common limitations
were discovered in the literature and summarised as follows:
(i) All research papers do not follow the same disci-
pline of section title and content.
(ii) Few of the reviewed publications feature enough
detail in the methodology sections to aid with the
exact replication of the featured study.
(iii) Details of piloting and testing data gathering in-
struments such as semistructured templates were
scarce.
(iv) (e robustness of some analyses was difficult to
determine.
(v) (e study featured participant perceptions, gauging
the efficiency of lessons learned was not well
supported in the text.
(vi) Safety culture and just culture are mentioned as
pivotal to learning. However, there is no solid
mechanism featured in support of objectively
measuring either cultural component in an aircraft
maintenance and continuing airworthiness man-
agement environment.
(vii) (e literature review uncovered many instances of
formal learning. It was noted that informal learning
practices were not well represented.
4. Conclusions
(e primary aim of learning from incidents is to support
actions that contribute to preventing recurrence of unwel-
come events.(e literature review revealed the existence of a
solid formal architecture capable of delivering lessons within
the featured domain activities. However, learning from
incidents is not specifically articulated as a requirement and
therefore presently not all elements required are explicitly
articulated with the regulatory code. Although some domain
requirements mandate formal training, informal learning
initiatives are not required to be capitalised upon. Addi-
tionally, inadequate incident causation can deflect from
potential learning opportunities arising from reporting.
Poorly resourced efforts to establish appropriate causation
are recorded as a central impediment to learning. (e
importance of reporting (incidents) and enabling facilitators
such as the presence of a just culture cannot be overstated.
Encouraging a reporting culture also reflects positively on
the potential to learn from reported incidents.
(e literature review also revealed the prevalence of
similar constraints to learning in other industries. Lukic et al.
[2] highlight the increasing focus on learning from incidents
in the health, safety, and environmental areas of the energy
industry. (ey put forward factors they consider to be
important for effective learning which bring a focus on; the
participants of learning, types of incident, types of knowl-
edge, and learning process. Drupsteen et al.’s [36] industrial
research (chemical, construction, energy, governmental
metal, and transport) states that “many incidents occur
because organisations fail to learn from past lessons.” (ey
point out that the traditional approach to learning often
features only a careful analysis and formulation of lessons in
the hope future incidents will be prevented. (ey suggest
that, in addition to focusing on prevention of reoccurrence,
the learning process should be improved which in turn can
contribute to making an organisation safer. Others such as
Jacobsson et al. [43] question the efficiency of learning from
incidents in some organisations (petrochemical, food and
drug, and energy) but suggest there is value in the analysis of
the learning cycle. Such an approach can offer an insight into
inherent weakness that often enables accidents. Silva et al.
[45] examine how organisations (manufacturing, con-
struction, production, and distribution of energy) use ac-
cident information to reduce the occurrence of unwelcome
events.(ey acknowledge there is a need to achieve a balance
between adequately resourcing safety initiatives and main-
taining acceptable levels of safety. In healthcare, Drupsteen
and Wybo [35] suggest an organisation can apply lessons
arising from past events such as warning signals, mistakes,
incidents, and accidents. Hindsight can assist with deter-
mining if an organisation did actually learn from an un-
welcome event, and their study expounds two sets of
indicators that could contribute to gauging an organisation’s
inclination to learn. By considering the outputs of research
in domains parallel to continuing airworthiness, the benefits
of proven approaches in other industries could be leveraged
and applied without further delay.
Many aspects of current literature are developed from a
linear or sequential view of how an accident/incident occurs.
(is of course might be an appropriate place to start to
examine the retrospective aspects of learning that an un-
welcome event can provide. However, more proactive
models such as Hollnagel et al.’s [51] FRAM model, as
highlighted by Furniss et al. [37], are very capable of de-
livering more sustainable lessons. Nevertheless, it is evident
from the literature search and review that research in the
aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness man-
agement arena are yet not well represented in respect of
learning from incidents.
One potential benefit of digressing from the traditional
view of causation is that models such as FRAM can be
applied in support of specific analysis frameworks capable of
deciphering: what went wrong, hazards that may have not
been previously considered, and the feasibility of potential
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solutions to prevent recurrence. As human systems and
artificial intelligence continue to occupy shared workspaces,
an appreciation of exactly how the system works is essential
in order to deliver effective lessons when unwelcome events
do occur. Further research in the continuing airworthiness
area utilizing forward looking frameworks such as FRAM
will have a positive impact on better understanding event
causation. It will also present a need to examine and aug-
ment legislative requirements to support the needs of reg-
ulatory and ethical oversight of systems that employ a blend
of human and autonomous functionality.
It is believed that the systematic review could be used to
refine terms of reference for a European legislative working
group tasked with improving the content of the imple-
menting regulations in the area of learning of incidents
within the context of SMSs in aircraft maintenance and
continuing airworthiness management organisations.
Data Availability
(e data supporting this systematic review are from pre-
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author upon request.
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